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8.1  Introduction 
The potential sensitivity of direct investment and trade flows to changes in 
tax rates in home and host countries often plays an important role in the eval- 
uation of  changes in tax  policy. In  U.S. discussions leading up  to the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986, the fear was frequently expressed that the elimination of 
the investment tax credit and the reduction in accelerated depreciation would 
cause many U.S. companies to shift operations abroad. Canada was cited as 
one convenient, readily available location. As another example, in the 1970s 
Canada enacted a lower tax rate for manufacturing because of fears that the 
tax benefits granted to U.S. exports by the Domestic International Sales Cor- 
poration (DISC) provisions would adversely affect Canadian industry. 
The purposes of  this paper are to evaluate several alternative measures of 
direct investment, trade, and taxes, and to size up their interrelation in a U.S. 
and Canadian data sample. Almost all recent empirical analyses of the impact 
of  tax policy  on cross-border investments by  multinational companies have 
focused on the financial flows used in the balance of  payments accounts as a 
measure of  investment (Hartman  1984 and  1985, Boskin  and  Gale  1987, 
Newlon 1987, Jun 1989, Slemrod 1990). These direct investment data repre- 
sent new  transfers to affiliates in the form of either debt or equity plus rein- 
vested earnings abroad. But, as Guy Stevens (1972) suggested, the financial 
flow data are an inadequate starting point for a study of real investment deci- 
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sions and changes in the location of U.S. controlled production. Real spend- 
ing by  foreign affiliates on plant and equipment can be  financed in  several 
ways, including depreciation allowances, local borrowing, and reduced hold- 
ing of  financial assets,  as well as transfers from the parent and reinvested 
earnings. Conversely, the foreign direct investment flow can finance increased 
holdings of financial assets and inventories as well as fixed capital. 
One goal of this paper is to assess whether the two measures reported by 
the U.S. Commerce Department (real spending on plant and equipment by 
U.S. affiliates and foreign direct investment flows recorded in the balance of 
payments) give different indications of the importance of tax policy in influ- 
encing U.S.-controlled manufacturing in Canada. It is difficult to predict on a 
priori grounds whether financial flows or real spending will be more respon- 
sive to changes in U.S. and Canadian tax rates. On  the one hand, it would 
appear that financial assets are more mobile than fixed capital assets and that 
financing  decisions  are  very  flexible,  even  with  given  investment  plans. 
Higher  statutory  tax  rates  abroad  may  cause  multinational  corporations 
(MNCs) to shift their borrowing to their affiliates in countries where deduc- 
tions are more valuable. However, it  may  also be true that factors such as 
exchange instability inhibit transfers from the parent, so that affiliates’ fixed 
investment abroad may be highly responsive to local tax rates without any 
accompanying changes in financial inflows. Finally, any difference between 
financial flows and real spending may be purely a matter of timing. Funds 
may be transferred to the affiliate in the anticipation of capital expenditures, 
but the increased spending may not be observed for some time. 
Real spending by U.S. affiliates in Canadian manufacturing is interesting in 
its own right and for how it compares with aggregate capital expenditures in 
Canadian manufacturing. Even in the absence of multinational corporations, 
increased U.S. corporate tax rates could lead to an outflow of portfolio invest- 
ment and  increased real  spending abroad.  Yet  are MNCs vehicles for still 
greater capital mobility? The question is whether any response of total Cana- 
dian capital expenditures to U.S. and Canadian tax rates is attributable largely 
to the activities of U.S. MNCs. 
The paper also considers the extent to which U.S .-Canadian trade patterns 
are influenced by changes in tax rates, including export incentives. Trade data 
are collected by  both the U.S.  and Canadian governments. In  the  1980s, a 
discrepancy between Canadian measures of  imports and U.S.  measures of 
exports caused the U. S. government to begin using the Canadian figures. An- 
other goal of this paper is to assess whether these different data series, and by 
implication efforts to measure trade flows more accurately, indicate a different 
role for tax policy in affecting trade. Alternatively, if data were more accurate, 
would analysts be able to determine the role of  policy more clearly? Or is 
economic theory itself so imprecise that refinements in the trade data are not a 
critical step in helping sort out policy questions? 
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representation of tax policy. Recent analysis of domestic investment by public 
finance economists has focused on the marginal effective tax rate applicable 
to new capital spending. Such a measure is a constructed variable, dependent 
upon assumptions regarding the appropriate discount rate, inflationary expec- 
tations, and depreciation practices. In this study we test various assumptions 
to see if the ones commonly made are the most consistent with actual invest- 
ment behavior. 
The data comparisons in the paper are, therefore, of several types. In one 
type, such as in the comparison of the financial flow data and the real spending 
data, series which differ in concept are examined (although many studies have 
used direct investment as a proxy for capital expenditures). In a second type, 
exemplified by the U.S. and Canadian trade data, alternative measures of  the 
same variables are tested. Yet another type is alternative measures of marginal 
effective tax rates, because the differences are due not to measurement error 
but to the different empirical assumptions made in constructing them. 
The empirical results suggest that the role of taxes in the investment process 
is much clearer and more significant in the case of  capital spending than in 
balance of payments flows. Effective tax rates based on assumptions typically 
made are not as successful in explaining investment as alternative measures. 
The effect of  taxes on trade is less clearcut than the effect on investment. 
Finally, MNCs appear to be the major source of any tax-induced reallocation 
of investment between Canada and the United States. 
8.2  The Alternative Data Sources and their Uses 
Canada was chosen as the subject of  the study in  part because series on 
marginal effective tax rates can be adapted from other studies. In addition, the 
integration of the U.S. and Canadian economies may make it easier to identify 
the responsiveness of  investment and production to changes in  tax  policy. 
Also, a long time series for U.S.  investment in  Canada can be assembled 
without disclosure problems. In  the case of  trade, Canadian statistics are a 
useful check on U.S. data. The analysis concentrates on manufacturing be- 
cause investment in petroleum, mining, or agriculture may be subject to dif- 
ferent forces and may be affected by very specific types of tax provisions. 
8.2.1  Investment 
The appropriate choice of the data series to be used depends on the issue at 
hand. As noted, expenditures on fixed investment are most relevant for con- 
sidering shifts in the location of production and their impact on trade flows.' 
In contrast, the balance of payments direct investment data are useful in study- 
I. After all, studies of  domestic capital expenditure by  U.S. corporations are not based on 
changes in the book value of their equity-which  would be parallel to the balance of payment 
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ing cross-border savings flows, the relationship between the capital and cur- 
rent account, and pressures on the exchange rate. For example, consider a 
large new investment project by a U.S. affiliate abroad that is financed entirely 
by  local borrowing. It will  eventually  represent  an important expansion  of 
productive capacity abroad, but it may have very little current impact on the 
structure of the balance of payments or exchange rates. 
These two measures of investment by U.S. affiliates in Canada, direct finan- 
cial investment flows as reported in the balance of payments and fixed invest- 
ment  expenditures by  majority-owned  affiliates,  are both  published  by  the 
U.S. Commerce Department. After 1976, the definition of majority owner- 
ship changed from “50 percent or more ownership” to “greater than 50 per- 
cent,’’ but this change seems to have had very little significance for Canadian 
investment.* While the plant-and-equipment  series includes only investment 
by majority-owned affiliates, this difference from the financial flow series does 
not appear significant. The 1982 Commerce benchmark survey indicates that 
93.5 percent of sales and 80.3 percent of capital expenditures by U.S. manu- 
facturing affiliates in Canada are accounted for by majority-owned affiliates. 
There are other coverage differences as well. For example, U.S. takeovers 
of Canadian companies would, in principle,  be in the financial flow data if 
financed  directly  by  the parent,  but not  in  the investment-spending  series 
(apart from the annual investment expenditures by the newly acquired affili- 
ate). However, it is not clear that the failure to include takeover investments is 
a shortcoming from a conceptual point of view. Takeovers of  existing Cana- 
dian operations may differ from investments increasing the capacity of affili- 
ates in terms of their impact on technology and trade flows. 
The foreign direct  investment  data itself are available in two forms. The 
version used in the analysis is the balance of payments capital outflow and is 
simply the sum of  retained  earnings plus equity and intercompany  account 
flows. The other version is the change in the book value of the foreign direct 
investment  position  from the beginning  of  the year to the end of  the year. 
These differ because of “valuation adjustments.” For example, if a subsidiary 
is liquidated  for more than its book value and the funds are repatriated, the 
decline in the direct investment position will reflect the original book value 
and not the larger capital outflow. Valuation adjustments are usually not large, 
but they are significant in some years. 
Figure 8.1 displays the movements of  gross plant and equipment spending 
by manufacturing  affiliates (PPE) and the two versions of foreign direct in- 
2. The major benchmark  adjustment  in both series in  1977 was dealt with by  using dummy 
variables in the regressions. Data on a 1977 base were available through 1984. The data after 1984 
on the new 1982 base were adjusted by  using observations available on both bases for 1984. We 
chose to  keep the data for 1982 through  1984 on the 1977 base in order to  limit the number of 
years for which spliced data had to be used. Although data were available on both bases for two 
or more years when benchmarks were changed, no attempt was made to exploit the overlapping 













vestment in manufacturing. BP1 refers to the change in the direct investment 
position, while BP2 is the total direct flow without valuation adjustments. It 
is evident that the real spending and financial flows frequently have behaved 
differently, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, when each 
series is detrended, there is virtually no remaining correlation between them. 
8.2.2  Manufacturing Imports and Exports 
Two  trade series are used. One is data on the value of  trade by  product 
category published in the Bank of  Canada Review.  The product detail given 
made it possible to exclude manufactured products with a large resource con- 
tent, such as forest products and nonferrous metals. It is one reason that total 
manufacturing import and export figures based on Canadian data may differ 
from the total manufacturing trade series derived from U.S. data. 
The second series is based on various publications of the U.S. Commerce 
Department. Imports and exports from 1965 to 1980 were taken from Over- 
seas Business Reports. For 1980 and subsequent years, US.  Foreign Trade 
Highlights was used. The published data after 1979 have been adjusted for 
undocumented transactions over the Canadian b~rder.~  In addition, the defi- 
3. In the 1966-87  period for which these data were available, there were occasional changes in 
some product categories. In all cases, however, there were several years in which the data were 
available on both bases. These overlapping data were used to splice the series together, with the 
accurate representation of the year-to-year rate of growth of trade as the objective. 
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nition of  manufacturing trade was expanded to include “category 9, other ex- 
ports .” 
Figures 8.2. and 8.3 present U.S. manufacturing imports and exports, as 
derived from Canadian and U.S. published sources. The two alternative series 
on U.S. imports in  figure 8.2, shown as Canadian exports (CNEX)  and U.S. 
imports (USIM),  are surprisingly close. Figure 8.3 confirms the year-by-year 
increase before 1980 of underreporting of U.S. exports by  official U.S. data 
(USEX)  compared to Canadian import data (CNIM).  The published U.S. data 
for 1980 and later, which include the undocumented exports, were spliced to 
the earlier series. The gap between the Canadian and U.S. series would, there- 
fore, be expected to continue because of the way we have constructed them. 
However, the gap does not seem to expand after 1980, so it appears that U.S. 
procedures have eliminated most of the inconsistency between the two series. 
8.2.3  Effective Tax Rates 
Marginal effective corporate tax rates for Canadian and U.S. manufacturing 
were derived from Hall-Jorgenson cost-of-capital estimates. The cost of capi- 
tal  is the annual pretax real return that a unit of  capital has to earn for the 
discounted value of  its net after-tax cash flows to just equal its initial price. 
The rate of return used to discount these real cash flows is the after-corporate- 
tax return required by  investors in the corporate sector. The discounted real 
cash flow includes the gross earnings of  the capital (net of the corporate tax 
rate on these earnings), plus the value of the depreciation deductions allowed 
for tax purposes and any investment grant or credit offered as an incentive by 
the government. Since the depreciation allowances are usually based on the 
historical cost of  the capital, the discounted real value of  these deductions 
depends on the expected inflation rate. Accordingly, the cost of  capital (and 
the marginal effective tax rate derived from it) summarizes the various char- 
acteristics of the tax system, such as the statutory or nominal tax rate and 
depreciation allowances. However, it is necessary to make assumptions about 
the required real return and the nature of  inflationary  expectation^.^ 
The effective tax rates for Canada are based on data provided by Jack Mintz 
and were used in  Boadway, Bruce and Mintz (1987). In some cases, these 
basic data were revised after consulting Boadway and Kitchen (1980) and the 
CCH Canadian Master Tax Guide.6 
The U.S. corporate effective tax rates were adapted from the data used by 
Auerbach and Hines (1988). In general an attempt was made to make assump- 
5. A more detailed explanation of  the derivation of effective tax rates is given in the Appendix. 
6. Newlon (1987) computed Canadian effective tax rates from basically the same sources, and 
while his series is generally consistent with ours for earlier years, there appear to be unexplained 
disparities toward the end. (See fig. 8.4;  NTAXCAN is Newlon’s tax series.) In particular, Newlon 
has Canadian effective tax rates increasing sharply in 1981 and remaining high through 1985 (the 
last year in his sample). Neither our series nor the one developed by Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 
shows such a large jump over this period. It is true that a half-year convention for tax depreciation 
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tions parallel to the Canadian estimates. Since the Auerbach and Hines data 
are  only  reported  through  1986, information  in  Fullerton,  Gillette,  and 
Mackie (1987) was used to project effective tax rates after 1986. 
In each case the effective tax rates refer to equity investment only. By intro- 
ducing the statutory tax rate differential as an explanatory variable, an attempt 
is made to control for the possibility that differences in statutory tax rates and 
inflation rates make it relatively  more advantageous to finance with debt in 
one country rather than another. In addition, there is no necessary connection 
between the location of an investment and the currency denomination of the 
debt with which it is financed. For example, the U.S. parent could finance its 
domestic investment  with debt in Canadian dollars. Estimating  effective tax 
rates for debt-financed  investment  is, therefore,  not as straightforward  as in 
the purely  domestic context because  it requires judgments on the currency 
denomination of the borrowing. 
Alternative Canadian and U.S. marginal effective tax rate series were con- 
structed based on differing assumptions on required rates of return and infla- 
tionary expectations. A required after-tax rate of return of 4 percent is com- 
monly used (e.g., by Auerbach and Hines 1988, and by Newlon  1987), and 
we show it for Canada as TAX CAN^ in figure 8.4. Also, we calculated a set 
based on an 8 percent return, shown for Canada as TAXCAN8. In each case the 
required real rates of  return are combined with expected inflation rates derived 
from ARIMA forecasts to form nominal  interest  rates. The nominal  interest 
rates are used to discount future depreciation deductions. These inflation fore- 
casts were developed by Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz for Canada and by Auer- 
bach and Hines for the United States. The 8 percent rate-of-return assumption 
is  in  part  motivated  by  Summers’ (1986) finding  that  companies apply  a 
higher rate of discount to cash flows than would be indicated by observed real 
rates of return. The higher rate tends to increase the weight of statutory tax 
rates  relative  to  investment  incentives  such  as  investment  credits  and  to 
smooth out the effect of changes in inflation. Figure 8.5 shows these series for 
Canada and the United States   TAX US^), and it demonstrates the divergence in 
policy between the two countries in the 1980s. As another variation (identified 
as ITAXCAN in fig. 8.4), we combine a 4 percent required real return with a 
constant assumed rate of inflation of 6 percent, to test the possibility that stan- 
dard effective tax rate estimates overemphasize  the role of changes in infla- 
tionary expectations. 
The effective tax rates for direct investment in Canada do not reflect  any 
residual U.S. tax paid on repatriated income. In part this is due to the virtual 
impossibility of  constructing a valid time series. Furthermore, over most of 
this period U.S. companies were apparently able to reduce or even eliminate 
the U.S.  tax  on Canadian income by using the “rhythm  method”  in timing 
their repatriations and real  investments  (or depreciation deductions)  in Can- 
ada. They would repatriate in years in which their realized Canadian tax rate 301  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
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Fig. 8.5  U.S. versus Canadian marginal effective tax rates 302  Harry Grubert and John Mutti 
was  high so that they would earn higher credits against U.S.  tax. (The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 ended the benefits of these cyclic repatriation schemes.)’ 
In calculating effective tax rates relevant for investment decisions by  U. S. 
MNCs, one issue that arises is the significance of  the oligopolistic nature of 
MNC activities. Does the standard Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital calculation 
represent it adequately? Even if a corporation has market power for some rea- 
son, its marginal cost of  capital is no more than the competitive return, be- 
cause that is all it has to offer new  shareholders or bondholders. In a purely 
domestic context, no adjustments appear necessary. If, however, an MNC is 
choosing between investment locations, the taxation of  any monopoly rents 
becomes important. Consider the case in which the cost of capital (and there- 
fore the marginal effective tax rate as usually measured) and marginal costs 
are the same in the two locations, but statutory rates differ. Shifting a dollar of 
capital from one country to the other (while continuing to supply the same 
market) will change the company’s after-tax profits by  the difference in the 
statutory tax rates times the average monopoly rent per unit of capital. This is 
a further reason for adding, as a variable, the difference in the statutory tax 
rates on manufacturing income. While the differential was never very great, 
the preference granted to Canadian manufacturing did create a gap of 8.0 per- 
centage points for a time in the late 1970s. 
In  some of the trade regressions, the U.S. effective tax rate is adjusted to 
reflect the benefits, beginning in  1972, offered to export income by  the Do- 
mestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) and subsequently by  the For- 
eign Sales Corporation (FSC) provisions. The reduction in effective tax rates 
on exports attributable to the DISC-FSC rules is based either on deferral or 
exemption rates in the relevant statutes, or, when deferral rates could vary, the 
actual rates given in annual U.S. Treasury reports on the operation and effect 
of the DISC legislation. 
8.2.4  Other Variables 
Relative unit labor costs, adjusted for exchange rates, are used as one indi- 
cator of  the cost of  manufacturing in Canada relative to the United States.* 
Capacity utilization rates are used  as an indicator of  demand-side determi- 
nants. Unit labor costs and capacity utilization rates in manufacturing were 
obtained from OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
7. A final reason for excluding the residual U.S. tax is the claim by  Hartman (1985) that the 
residual U.S. tax is irrelevant for the choice of  investment location if it is financed by an affiliate’s 
retained earnings;  the reason  is that the tax  has to be paid sooner or later. The analysis thus 
parallels the so-called “new view” of dividend taxation in the purely domestic context. 
8. A conventional real exchange-rate measure could be used, but it might confound the role of 
taxes in costs. Because taxes are one of  the costs that can be reflected in prices,  some of the 
variations in real exchange rates could be attributable to tax changes. A real exchange-rate mea- 
sure may play a role in determining foreign investment, apart from its effect on relative costs. For 
example, Froot and Stein (1989) have argued that the apparent increase in direct investment in the 
United States when the real value of the dollar is low results from the increased relative financial 
strength of foreign corporations. 303  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
8.3  Analysis of the Alternative Series 
The investment equations used are designed to represent the choice of in- 
vestment location by  U.S.  multinational corporations. Thus, they are not of 
the Jorgenson “neoclassical” type, in which output or sales are regarded as 
exogenous, because the amount of output or sales in a given location is part 
of  the decision proce~s.~  Actual net rates of return earned in Canada by  U.S. 
affiliates relative to U.S. returns are not included explicitly for several rea- 
sons. One is that, as Jun (1989) and others have pointed out, perturbations in 
rates of  return are transmitted mechanically to measured direct investment, 
which is composed mainly of retained earnings. In addition, a reported profit 
in any location can itself be a function of  the tax  rate and may not  be  an 
accurate indicator of “true” profitability (e.g., Grubert and Mutti 1991). 
In relating investment to tax and other variables over time, it is necessary 
to choose a proper scaling factor for investment because of potential hetero- 
scedasticity problems when an unscaled dependent variable is used. Slemrod 
and Newlon each use host country GDP. For plant and equipment spending 
by  U.S.  affiliates in Canada, comparable investment spending in the United 
States seems a natural denominator. The ratio of Canadian to U.S. expendi- 
tures is expressed in real terms by first converting affiliate spending into Ca- 
nadian dollars and then dividing spending in each country by  the country’s 
Gross National Expenditure deflator. The regression equation can then be in- 
terpreted as representing U. s. companies’ choice between real investment in 
the United States or in Canada. One advantage of this formulation is that it 
controls for worldwide changes in  capital costs, which would affect invest- 
ment spending in both the United States and Canada. Financial flows are di- 
vided (scaled) by the total (internal and external) sources of funds of the U.S. 
nonfinancial corporate sector, as reported by the Federal Reserve Board. The 
variable therefore represents the share of the U.S. MNCs’ funds (not including 
affiliates’ third-party borrowing) that are allocated to Canada. 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present results for balance of payments direct investment 
and capital expenditures respectively. The various cases correspond to differ- 
ent forms of the tax variables used, as well as to other changes in specifica- 
tion, such as whether the tax rates are lagged or not. (For example, “us METR 
4% Return” refers to the U.S.  marginal effective tax  rate  in manufacturing 
assuming a required real after-corporate-tax return of  4 percent.)’O In  most 
cases, a linear equation is used. In addition to U.S. and Canadian marginal 
tax rates, the independent variables include: 
a. a dummy variable for the years after 1976, to reflect the 1977 benchmark 
adjustment; 
9. For a discussion of  various types of investment equations, see Feldstein (1982). 
10. Durbin-Watson statistics are not separately reported because of space limitations. In no case 
were they of  a level to suggest the need for correction for serial correlation. Table 8.1  Comparison of Regressions Using Alternative Investment and Effective Tax Rate Measures. Dependent Variable: Balance of 
Payments Measure of Foreign Direct Investment, Divided by U.S. Flow of Funds (&values  in parenthesis) 
Exchange  Canadian  Real 
U.S.  Canadian  Dummy  Time  Capacity  Exchange  Rate  Adjusted 
Case  Tax  Tax  1977  Trend  Utilization  Rate  Uncertainty  Intercept  R2 
us METR 4% Return  3.36  3.98  -4.53  .30  .I8  -  16.17  .57 
CN METR 4% Return  (.93)  (.54)  (-3.15)  (2.82)  (2.01)  (- 2.01) 
us METR 8% Return  I 1.57  -4.09  -4.92  .41  .I9 
CN METR 8% Return  (1.83)  (-.48)  (-3.56)  (3.51)  (2.51) 
us 6% lnflation  16.18  -  10.37  -5.69  .44  .22 
CN METR 6% Inflation  (2.00)  (I .38)  (-4.  I I)  (3.54)  (3.01) 
-  17.57  .60 
(- 2.50) 
-  18.69  .61 
(- 2.60) 
us METR 4% Return  4.75  -3.66  -5.36  .41  .I7  -  13.09  .57 
CN Newlon Tax  (1.33)  ( -  .59)  (-3.18)  (2.64)  (I .74)  (1.64) 
us METR 4% Return, 
Total  13.00  -  6.99  -4.77  .40  .22 
CN METR 4% Return  (3.  I  I)  (- .98)  (- 3.97)  (4.47)  (3.42) 
-  18.72 
(-3.06)  .70 
us METR 4% Return, 
CN METR 4% Return  (2.91)  (- 1.35)  (2.59)  (3.19)  (3.36)  (.21)  (-1.19)  ( -  2.30)  .69 
Total  17.08  -  11.52  -  4.07  .44  .23  1.16  -  .30  -  20.02 
US AVG TAX  24.60  .47  -  3.95  .23  .26 
CN AVG TAX  (3.38)  (0.03)  (-2.75)  (3.10)  (3.52) 
-  18.43  .71 
(- 2.92) 
Nore: Time period is 1963-87,  annual data (except for Newlon tax series terminated in 1985). METR =  marginal effective tax rate; AVG =  average effective tax rate 
after removing the influence of cyclical factors. Tax rates apply to manufacturing only, except where the total or economy-wide rate is noted. 305  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
b.  a time  trend, which  indicates the  impact of  any difference  in long-term 
growth in Canada compared to the United States; 
c. the capacity utilization rate in Canadian manufacturing (in part intended as 
an indicator of the profitability of investing in Canada; for financial flows, 
there may be a more direct relationship if increased profits result in higher 
retained earnings); 
d. a relative labor cost variable, equal to the ratio of U.S. to Canadian unit 
labor costs adjusted for exchanges rates; and 
e.  a measure of exchange-rate instability based on the squared changes in the 
previous three years,  with the more recent years weighted  more heavily. 
Companies may hedge exchange-rate uncertainty by engaging in more lo- 
cal borrowing  in  host-country  currencies, reducing balance of  payments 
flows. 
The results for financial flows in table 8.1 reveal that the coefficient for U.S. 
effective tax rates is sometimes significant, although the Canadian rate gener- 
ally is not; this result tends to cast doubt on the role of taxes. Tax rates tend to 
have more explanatory  power when the U.S.  economy-wide corporate rate, 
rather than the more noisy manufacturing-only rate, is used. The significance 
of taxes in determining financial flows is not increased when the tax rates are 
lagged. 
Table 8.2 indicates that lagged effective tax rates are frequently significant 
in the capital spending regressions. This is particularly true when the effective 
tax rate based on an 8 percent required real return  is used.  In addition,  we 
expect a reduction in Canadian tax rates to have at least as large an impact as 
an equivalent rise in U.S.  tax rates, because the lower Canadian rate can at- 
tract  investment from locations other than the United States and can lead to 
expansion in the total U.S.-Canadian  market for the MNC’s production. ‘I The 
relative magnitudes of the Canadian and U. S.  tax coefficients reported in table 
8.2 for real capital spending generally support this view, whereas the effect 
seldom is observed in table 8.1 for financial flows. The lagged tax rates are 
also highly significant when  stated as a differential  to reduce the impact of 
multicollinearity.  (In  those  cases only  a coefficient  for U.S. tax  is given.) 
Table 8.2 also suggests that, while the unlagged form of the tax rates based 
on 4  and 8 percent rates of return are not significant, other variations of current 
tax rates are sometimes significant. However, these unlagged forms are gen- 
0 
1 1.  Scholes and Wolfson (1989) claim that the rise in U.S. effective corporate tax rates as a 
result of  the Tax Reform Act of  1986 actually increased foreign investment in the United States; 
foreign companies based in countries that grant a credit for foreign taxes could simply use the 
higher U.S. taxes to reduce their home-country tax liability. The ability to credit U.S.  taxes gave 
them an advantage over domestic U.S. companies. This kind of effect could conceivably explain 
the insignificant or positive coefficient for Canadian taxes in some of the regressions, because the 
United States also grants a credit for foreign taxes. As noted earlier, however, before 1987 most 
U.S. companies in Canada were apparently able to eliminate any residual U.S. tax by  using the 
“rhythm method.” If that was the case, any increase in Canadian tax would not have caused an 
offsetting reduction in U.S.  tax. Table 8.2  Comparison of Regressions Using Alternative Investment and Effective Tax Rate Measures. Dependent Variable: Real Property, 
Plant and Equipment Expenditures of Affiliates, Divided by Real U.S. Expenditures for Plant and Equipment (t-values  in 
parenthesis) 
Case 
Canadian  Real  Exchange 
Adjusted  U.S.  Canadian  Dummy  Time  Capacity  Exchange  Rate 
Tax  Tax  1977  Trend  Utilization  Rate  Uncertainty  Intercept  R’ 
us METR 4% Return, Lagged 
CN  METR 4% Return, Lagged 
us METR 4% Return, Lagged 
CN  METR 4% Return, Lagged 
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Nore: Time period is 1963-87,  annual data (except for Newlon tax series terminated in 1985). METR =  marginal effective tax rate; AVG =  average effective tax rate 
after removing the influence of cyclical factors. Dependent variable as noted, except in equations labelled with superscript a, where it is Canadian real plant and 
equipment expenditures in manufacturing divided by U.S.  real plant and equipment expenditures.  Tax rates apply to manufacturing only, except where the total or 
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erally significant only when U.S. economy-wide tax rates are used, and they 
are conceptually less appealing than our basic rates for manufacturing. 
In comparing the responsiveness of financial flows and real spending to tax 
changes, we are interested primarily  in the absolute changes of  investment 
spending in U.S. dollars.  Does the increase of financial flows in response to 
changes in Canadian  and U.S.  tax rates greatly exceed any increase in real 
spending because of the mobility of financial capital? Alternatively, does the 
increase in financial flows represent only a small fraction of the increase in 
real spending because of other sources of finance such as local borrowing? 
The level of gross plant and equipment spending is always higher than direct 
investment flows because of the large base of  gross investment  necessary  to 
replace depreciating capital. A comparison of elasticity measures is therefore 
not very helpful. Because different scaling factors are used for financial flows 
and capital spending, the coefficients have to be translated back into a com- 
parable U.S. dollar basis. 
Translating  the coefficients in tables 8.1 and 8.2 into absolute changes in 
U.S. dollars suggests that not only is the effect of  taxes more robust in ex- 
plaining real capital spending, but the quantitative response to a given change 
in tax rates is also somewhat larger. For example if we take the typical coeffi- 
cient of about -  11.0 for Canadian tax rates in table 8.1 and  -23.0  in table 
8.2, and use the mean values of the appropriate denominator in the regression, 
we  find that  a reduction of  Canadian  tax  rates of  10 percentage  points  in- 
creases capital spending (with a lag) by $335 million and financial flows by 
$265 million, a difference of about 20 percent. l2 While these are roughly com- 
parable, they suggest that, if anything, capital spending is more responsive to 
tax rates than financial direct investment. 
These results demonstrate that taxes can have a quantitatively large effect 
on cross-border  investment. For example, the $335 million increase in plant 
and equipment expenditures corresponds to a 15.7 percent increase in capital 
spending (using the mean value) in response to the 10 percentage point reduc- 
tion in tax rates. Moreover, this represents a percentage increase in gross cap- 
ital expenditures; the percentage increase in net investment is (at least in the 
short run) much larger. 
Tables 8.1 and  8.2 indicate  that financial  flows and real  investment  also 
behave differently in other ways. One clear difference is the much greater sig- 
nificance of the Canadian capacity utilization rates in financial flows, presum- 
ably due to the effect of profitability on retained earnings, one of the compo- 
nents  of  direct  investment.  Financial  flows  also  exhibit  a  much  more 
consistent and significant rising trend. 
A further difference is  the  role of  real  exchange  rates (or relative  labor 
12. The mean value of the denominator in the balance of  payments regressions in table 8.1 is 
241.7. The comparable factor for capital spending, reflecting the combined effect of the deflators 
and the U.S. investment in the denominator, is 145.5. 309  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
costs). Foreign direct investment in Canadian manufacturing increases as the 
U.S. real exchange rate increases. This is consistent with the findings of Froot 
and Stein (1989) for direct investment in the United States. The coefficient is 
not significant, but it probably would be if direct investment were expressed 
in  Canadian dollars to be consistent with  Froot and Stein. In contrast, real 
spending by  U.S. affiliates decreases with  an  increase in the U.S. real ex- 
change rate,  although the coefficient is again insignificant. Thus, the Froot 
and Stein result does not hold up for real capital expenditures and seems more 
related to the rearrangement of financial portfolios. 
One area in which, surprisingly, a difference does not show up is the impact 
of  exchange-rate instability. A comparison of  results  in tables 8.1 and 8.2 
indicates that financial flows are discouraged by  exchange-rate instability no 
more than is real investment. 
The results in tables 8.1 and 8.2 for the various forms of the tax variables 
suggest that the standard assumptions made in constructing effective tax rates 
do not produce the most successful explanations of  changes in  investment. 
Tax  rates based on a required real rate of  return of  8 percent generally have 
much  more  explanatory  power,  with  larger coefficients (and  the  expected 
sign), than rates based on the usual 4 percent assumption. Other alternatives 
seem  frequently  to  perform  better  than  the  basic  4-percent-plus-~~i~~- 
forecast; for example, when a constant 6 percent expected rate of  inflation is 
substituted. In view of these results, it appears that the standard assumptions 
used  in constructing marginal effective tax rates should be reexamined. In 
addition, a required return of 8 percent leads to much different conclusions as 
to the effect of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 on corporate effective tax rates. 
Instead of  an  substantial increase in  the effective corporate tax rate,  there 
would have been virtually no change.I3 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 also show that the average effective U.S. corporate tax 
rate performs very well in the regressions both for real spending and financial 
flows. This result is surprising in light of the research popularity of marginal 
effective tax rates.  Average effective rates have some advantages over mar- 
ginal effective rates, because the latter focus on only a few basic features of 
the tax system, such as depreciation allowances and investment credits and 
may overlook other provisions more difficult to mode1.14 The average effective 
Canadian corporate tax rate is not significant, but the coefficient of the lagged 
13. At a presentation of  an earlier version of this paper, Jane Gravelle of  the Congressional 
Research Service kindly offered to make her U.S. effective tax rate series available. The Gravelle 
series is much smoother than the Auerbach-Hines series. Nevertheless, the general pattern of  the 
results tends to be confirmed when the Gravelle series is used, with real spending more responsive 
to tax rates than the financial flows. However, the significance of the Canadian tax rate is reduced. 
14. The average effective tax rates we use have been cyclically corrected by using the residuals 
from a regression of the average rates on the country’s capacity utilization rates. Otherwise, the 
observed average tax rate might spuriously reflect changes in the business cycle and not in tax 
policy, because the larger number of  loss companies in a recession raises the measured average 
effective tax rate. 310  Harry Grubert and John Mutti 
version does have the expected  sign in the real spending regressions and is 
quantitatively almost as large as when marginal effective tax rates are used. 
The less significant role of  the Canadian  average tax rate  is not surprising 
because,  as with the U.S. average rate, it applies to all corporations and not 
just manufacturing. The Canadian tax incentives were targeted to manufactur- 
ing by means of a special statutory tax rate and highly accelerated deprecia- 
tion if the equipment was used in manufacturing and processing.I5 
The regressions reported  in tables 8.1 and 8.2 follow previous  studies on 
the impact of taxes on foreign direct investment in relating the flow of  new 
investment to the level of U.S. and foreign tax rates. However, if the relation- 
ship between desired  stocks of capital and effective tax rates is the starting 
point for the analysis, the change in tax rates would be a determinant of  the 
change in the stock of capital  (i.e., the net investment  component of gross 
investment). (The level of the tax rate would also have an effect on net invest- 
ment because of the growth in the economy.) When the first differences of the 
tax variables were substituted in the equation for plant-and-equipment  spend- 
ing they were generally not significant and often had the wrong signs. In the 
financial  flow equations, the  first differences  of the  tax  variables  tended  to 
have coefficients with the expected signs and were of borderline significance 
for some versions of  the effective tax rate measures.  However,  a complete 
specification with both current and lagged taxes was not very successful be- 
cause of the multicollinearity that arises from using several tax variables. 
The differential between the U.S.  and Canadian statutory tax rates was in- 
cluded  as a  variable  in  some of  the  investment  regressions.  As  suggested 
above, it might be expected to play a role in the balance of payments equations 
because of the likelihood of greater local borrowing if the Canadian statutory 
tax rate is higher; real spending could be affected because of  the benefits of 
locating monopoly rents in a low statutory tax rate country. Nevertheless, the 
statutory tax rate differential was not significant in either case. 
A useful check on our conclusions regarding the relationship between  fi- 
nancial flows to Canada and capital expenditure by Canadian affiliates is pro- 
vided in table 8.3. Table 8.3  presents sources and uses of funds data for a sample 
of  worldwide  majority-owned  manufacturing affiliates from 1966 to 1976.  l6 
(Nondisclosure  problems  made  it  impossible  to  construct  data  for  Canada 
only.) The sum of  the first two sources of funds correspond basically to for- 
eign direct investment as reported  in the balance of payments,  although the 
second also includes a small number of transfers from affiliates other than the 
15. The regressions in table 8.1 are all linear, not log-linear, in part to avoid the problem of 
negative values in the financial flow data. The log-linear regressions at the end of table 8.2 indicate 
that the coefficients of the tax  variables are somewhat more significant statistically than in the 
comparable  linear  regressions.  The tax elasticities  (with the linear elasticity  evaluated at  the 
means) are very close. (In the log version, the tax variable is one minus the effective tax rate.) 
16. It is unfortunate that after 1976 the Commerce Department no longer published annual data 
on the sources and uses of  funds of  affiliates abroad.  Partial sources-and-uses data begin to be 
available again after 1982. Table 8.3  Sources and Uses of Funds of a Sample of US.  Affiliates in Manufacturing, 1966-76  (in millions of dollars) 
Sources  Uses 
Internal  External 
Retained  Parent and  Total  Fixed  Change in  Other (including 
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’ “Sources and Uses of  Funds of  Majority-Owned Foreign AWliates of  U.S. Companies, 
~  ___~  ~~ 
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parent. The “other” internal source includes items such as proceeds from sales 
of assets. External sources include third-party borrowing by the affiliate. 
As a result of the stability of depreciation allowances, fluctuations in inter- 
nal sources of  funds reflect mainly changes in foreign direct investment (indi- 
cated in the first two columns). Table 8.3 indicates that capital spending often 
tracks internal sources of funds but diverges significantly in some years, such 
as 1969 and 1972, when the increase in internal funds seems to be associated 
with increased financial assets. Overall, it appears that changes in inventories 
are the most volatile use of funds and are more closely linked to changes in 
external funding  than to internal sources. On the whole,  these data confirm 
our earlier  finding that  direct  investment  and capital  spending are virtually 
uncorrelated apart from a trend and that they are affected by different forces. 
One controversy in  the analysis of  MNCs is whether  they contribute to 
more capital mobility and reallocation of investment than would occur simply 
because of portfolio adjustments. Even in the absence of direct investment, 
increased taxes on manufacturing companies in the United States could lower 
rates of return in the corporate sector and lead to an outflow of portfolio capi- 
tal to other countries. The contribution  of MNCs to capital mobility can be 
tested with regressions parallel to the affiliate spending equation in table 8.2, 
but  with  aggregate capital  expenditures in  Canadian  manufacturing  substi- 
tuted for affiliate investment.  The dependent variable would then become the 
ratio of total real capital expenditures in Canadian manufacturing to real in- 
vestment in U.S. manufacturing. 
The two equations marked  with a superscript a in table 8.2 are based  on 
this alternative dependent variable, and they suggest that MNCs are very sig- 
nificant contributors to the reallocation of capital between U.S. and Canadian 
manufacturing. The coefficients for U.S. tax rates in these linear regressions 
are virtually the same as in the comparable ones for U.S. affiliate investment 
only. The impact of U.S. tax rates on Canadian investment seems almost ex- 
clusively  due to the decisions of  U.S. multinational  corporations. It is also 
interesting that the absolute size of the Canadian tax rate coefficient is much 
larger for total Canadian investment  than for U.S.  affiliates only; this  may 
reflect the standard impact of  taxes on investment in a purely domestic con- 
text.  Even then, since total Canadian investment in manufacturing is on the 
average about three times the level of U.S. affiliate investment, investment by 
U.S. affiliates seems about twice as responsive to Canadian tax rates as other 
non-U.S.  -controlled investment. 
We now turn to the effect of taxes on trade. A standard formulation of Ca- 
nadian demand for U.S. exports would express it as a function of economic 
activity  in  Canada (GDP), the price of  U.S.  goods expressed  in  Canadian 
dollars, and the price of Canadian goods. (The prices of other countries’ prod- 
ucts  are generally  ignored.) Determinants of  U.S.  and Canadian prices are 
substituted  directly  into this expression. Higher  U.S.  labor costs, a higher 313  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
value of  the U.S. dollar,  and lower unit labor costs and activity in Canada 
contribute to lower U.S. exports. 
Taxes can affect trade through several channels. One is by their impact on 
the investment and productive capacity of U.S. affiliates in Canada. Another 
route is the change in output sourcing for a given distribution of capital in the 
two countries. For example, if capacity is available in each country, the com- 
pany may have an incentive to produce in the location with the lower statutory 
tax rate.  (If capital is given, incentives such as investment credits that cause 
the discrepancy between  effective and statutory  tax  rates  are not  relevant.) 
Finally, changes in corporate tax rates may change the comparative advantage 
of  various industries because of differences in capital intensity and the extent 
of  incorporation. This effect can operate even in the absence of capital flows 
or direct investment. 
Table  8.4 provides  results  for (log-linear)  regressions  on U.S.-Canadian 
manufacturing trade that attempt to identify the role of taxes. Separate equa- 
tions for U.S. exports to Canada and Canadian imports from the United States 
are given because of the measurement differences between them displayed in 
figure 8.3.  Separate regressions for Canadian exports to the United States are 
not given because they are virtually identical to measured U.S. imports. The 
equations in table 8.4  are different from conventional trade equations in that 
the absence of available deflators for U. S .-Canadian manufacturing trade ne- 
cessitates the use of nominal imports or exports on the left-hand side.” 
In the regressions for U.S. exports, the tax coefficients have the expected 
signs; lower U.S. taxes increase U.S.  exports and lower Canadian taxes re- 
duce them. When the U.S. tax rate is adjusted for DISC and FSC benefits, the 
coefficient is larger compared to the unadjusted rate and is of borderline sig- 
nificance. The Canadian tax rate is also of  borderline significance when the 
Canadian capacity utilization rate is added as a variable. When only one plus 
the percentage-point  reduction in the tax rate on export income attributable to 
DISC is used as the U.S. tax variable, it is close to being significant. Further- 
more, the coefficient suggests a potentially  large effect. The .84 coefficient 
would imply an expansion of U.S. exports to Canada of about  14 percent at 
the beginning  of  the program  when benefits  were high, and would  further 
imply that exports are now about 6 percent higher than they would be in the 
absence of FSC benefits. 
The U.S. export and Canadian import equations yield roughly comparable 
estimates. Even though the Canadian trade data may be more accurate than 
U. S. data, economic relationships expected on theoretical grounds cannot be 
17. That is another reason why the  various components of the real exchange rate used in the 
investment part of the study (unit labor costs in each country and the nominal exchange rate) are 
entered separately. The unobserved deflators are presumably functions of these variables as well 
as the tax  rates, but the deflators for U.S. exports are  likely to depend on US.  unit labor costs 
much more heavily than on the exchange rate or Canadian costs. Table 8.4  U.S.-Canadian Tkade Relationships 
U.S.  Canadian 
Real  Exchange  Unit  Unit  Canadian 
DISC +  DISC  Canadian  GDPof  Exchange  Rate  Labor  Labor  Capacity 
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identified any more precisely. Some differences do emerge when the Canadian 
capacity utilization rate is included. Canadian taxes are much more significant 
in the Canadian import series, but the signs of some of the other coefficients 
are unexpected. 
In the U.S. import equation, the Canadian tax rate has an unexpected neg- 
ative coefficient (in this log 1 - t version) and is highly significant. In other 
words, lower Canadian taxes decrease U.S.  imports from Canada. A further 
disturbing aspect of the U.S. import equation is that, while the U.S.  and Ca- 
nadian unit labor costs are highly significant and have the expected signs, the 
sign of  the coefficient for the price of  U.S. dollars is negative and significant. 
This may be explained by the significant resource content of Canadian exports 
even  in  manufacturing. The Canadian exchange rate  may  be  high  during 
worldwide booms in which commodity prices and Canadian nominal exports 
are high. 
To sum up the role of tax rates in U.S.-Canadian trade: there is suggestive 
evidence  that  U.S.  tax  incentives  for exports increased exports to Canada. 
Nevertheless,  it is difficult to make firm judgments on the overall role of taxes 
because the coefficients for some of the variables, such as Canadian taxes in 
the Canadian export equation, have signs contrary to expectations. 
8.4  Summary and Conclusions 
1. U.S.  and Canadian marginal  effective tax rates appear to have a more 
statistically significant,  robust, and quantitatively large effect on real capital 
spending than on financial flows. The common assumption that financial as- 
sets are more mobile in response to tax rates does not seem to be borne out. 
Exchange rate instability also does not have a greater effect on financial flows 
than on real  spending. Financial  direct investment  is  strongly influenced by 
cyclical factors, which determine the amount of profits available for retention 
abroad. 
2. Multinational  corporations seem to be very important  vehicles  for the 
reallocation  of capital between the United States and Canada. Any response 
of  total investment in Canadian manufacturing  to U.S. corporate tax rates is 
attributable exclusively  to investment by U.S. affiliates. Investment by U.S. 
affiliates in Canada is also much more responsive to Canadian tax rates than is 
non-U.  S.  -controlled investment. 
3. Marginal effective tax rates based on the standard assumptions with re- 
spect to required rates of  return and inflationary expectations are not as suc- 
cessful  in  explaining changes  in  investment  as rates  based  on alternative 
assumptions.  In  particular,  much  higher  required  rates  of  return  than  are 
usually  assumed seem to be  warranted.  In  some cases,  average  corporate 
tax rates even have more explanatory power than standard marginal effective 
rates. 
4. The role of taxes in trade seems much less clear than it is in cross-border 316  Harry Grubert and  John  Mutti 
investment. There is suggestive evidence that U.S. tax incentives for exports 
may have led to an expansion of U.S. exports to Canada. 
Appendix 
The Cost of Capital and Efective Tax Rates 
The cost of capital services, c (the gross annual return a unit of capital must 
yield), is derived by equating the acquisition cost of a unit of capital, q, with 
the present value of the cash flows obtained by the capital. These cash flows 
are 
c(l -  u) 
r+6 + qk + quZ 
where  u  is  the  statutory  corporate  tax  rate,  r  is  the  required  real  after- 
corporate-tax rate of return, 6 is the exponential rate at which the capital good 
depreciates,  k is the investment tax credit rate, and Z  is the present value of 
depreciation allowances per dollar of  investment. If depreciation allowances 
are in nominal terms based on historical costs, they have to be translated into 
real terms by discounting them with a nominal interest rate that is assumed 
to be the real rate, r, plus the expected rate of inflation. (We assume that the 
firm uses equity financing exclusively.) Equating q with the present value of 
the cash flows above and solving for c gives the familiar Hall-Jorgenson for- 
mula: 
ua(r  + 6) 
q(1 - k - 
(1 -  u) 
c= 
The marginal effective tax rate, t, is defined as the statutory tax rate that would 
yield the same cost of capital under a pure income tax with tax depreciation 
equal to real economic depreciation and no investment credit. Accordingly, it 
is the annual tax wedge (the difference between the gross cost of capital ser- 
vices clq and r  + 8)  divided by the pretax return net of economic deprecia- 
tion, or 
clq - (r + 6) 
t= 
clq - 6 
and can be computed using the above formula for c. 
18. See Auerbach (1983) for a detailed discussion of effective tax rate computations 317  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
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Comment  Edward M. Graham 
To  my mind, the Grubert and Mutti paper is an excellent contribution, not so 
much to the literature on the effects of tax policy on foreign direct investment 
Edward M. Graham is a senior research  fellow at the Institute for International Economics, 
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(FDI) as to the debate on how best to measure FDI. This is not to say that the 
paper makes no contribution to the tax question. It does. It is simply to say 
that I find the latter contribution to be more interesting and more important. 
FDI represents something other than an international transfer of physical or 
financial capital. The essence of FDI is that a firm domiciled in one nation 
acquires managerial control over a firm domiciled in some other nation. The 
most widely accepted explanation for the phenomenon is that the parent firm 
possesses  some sort of  asset-usually  one of  an  intangible nature  such as 
technology or some other form of “human capital”-that  can be transferred 
to the controlled subsidiary so as to generate a rent. Quite a long literature has 
been developed in recent years centering around the hypothesis that for FDI 
to make sense there must also be an advantage to the firm associated with 
internalization of the asset. That is, the optimal strategy for utilization of the 
asset must be to “work” it inside the firm, rather than to license it for a fee to 
other firms. 
A basic question then is how to measure FDI. The standard flow measure 
used in analytic work has been FDI on a balance of payments basis, a measure 
of financial flow between a parent firm and a controlled subsidiary. Different 
national  authorities  define this measure in  slightly different ways, and thus 
there is a comparability problem when using data from different nations.  In 
the United States, the relevant authority is the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). BEA considers an FDI flow to be the sum of any increase (or de- 
crease) in the equity investment (including retained earnings) of a parent in a 
foreign subsidiary (providing that the parent holds at least 10 percent of  the 
voting stock of the subsidiary), plus any net change in the intrafirm debt po- 
sition between such a parent and subsidiary. 
This measure can be misleading in a number of ways with respect to the 
goal of detecting changes in a parent firm’s directly controlled interests in a 
foreign country. (i) What is really a passive investment by a parent can some- 
times be classified as a direct investment (e.g., the holding of a substantial 
block of Du Pont stock by Seagrams. This holding is classified by BEA as an 
FDI, but Seagrams has made a point of asserting that it neither now holds nor 
intends to try in the future to establish managerial control over Du Pont). (ii) 
A subsidiary can increase the level of its participation in the host-nation econ- 
omy without this increase being reflected in an increased holding of equity or 
intrafirm debt by the parent  firm in  the subsidiary (e.g., the subsidiary ex- 
pands its operations and finances its capital expenditures via local debt). (iii) 
The parent can increase its holding of equity or intrafirm debt in a subsidiary 
without the subsidiary actually increasing the scale of its business in the host 
nation  (e.g., in the mid-1980s British Petroleum  increased its share of the 
voting stock held in its U.S. subsidiary from something like 60  percent to 100 
percent, thus creating a large FDI flow into the United States by the balance 
of payments measure, even though the subsidiary did not significantly alter 
the nature or scale of its participation in the U.S. economy). 319  Financial Flows versus Capital Spending 
But if balance of  payments measure of FDI is not wholly satisfactory as a 
measure  of  FDI,  what  is?  Grubert  and  Mutti  suggest  new  plant-and- 
equipment expenditures (PPE) by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms, a data series 
that is also published by BEA for overseas affiliates of U.S. firms. The authors 
show that with respect to U.S. firms’ activities in Canada, the balance of pay- 
ments FDI flow measure is not highly correlated with the PPE measure, and 
that the  latter is more responsive  to changes  in effective tax rates than  the 
former. 
For established  subsidiaries,  the first result  is not really surprising.  From 
the perspective of the subsidiary, PPE are uses of funds, whereas increases in 
equity held by parent or debt owed to the parent are sources of funds. Equity 
and intrafirm debt are but two means by which PPE can be financed. Elemen- 
tary finance theory teaches that whether to make a capital investment and how 
to finance the investment should be treated as largely separate decisions by a 
firm. Thus, only to the extent that PPE is financed by subsidiaries by calling 
upon parent-firm resources would one expect it to be correlated with balance 
of  payments  FDI  flows.  The correlation  would be  relatively  low if  we re- 
stricted our attention to expansion of existing subsidiaries. A well-capitalized 
subsidiary could, for example, finance an expansion program by  means of 
host-country borrowing.  And, at least with respect to Canada, most PPE by 
local affiliates of U.S. firms are made by ones that have been long established 
there. This correlation would be greater, however, if  we were to restrict our 
observations to the creation of new subsidiaries investing in greenfields proj- 
ects. Presumably,  the financing of  such a new venture would include a sub- 
stantial block of equity capital. 
But then, which is the better of the two measures? The answer will depend 
entirely on the objective of the analysis. Again, if the objective is to measure 
the  response  of  existing  local  affiliates  under  control  of  foreign  firms  to 
changes  in  domestic  economic  policy  variables  implemented  by  the  host- 
nation government, then the PPE measure likely will be the more appropriate 
one. But if the objective is to measure the response of  new FDI flowing into a 
nation (including takeovers of formerly domestically controlled firms by for- 
eign investors) to changes in these variables, then use of the balance of pay- 
ments measure is more likely to be warranted. Actually, as is detailed below, 
what one would really wish to use as a measure of such new FDI would be a 
disaggregated  balance of payments  measure,  but this is not presently  avail- 
able. 
Thus, my interpretation of the finding by Grubert and Mutti that PPE are 
more responsive to changes in Canadian effective tax rates than are balance of 
payment FDI flows is simply that changes in these rates affect the operations 
of the many established Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. firms much more than 
they affect the rate of creation of new such subsidiaries. 
This interpretation must be tempered by consideration of the composition 
of  the balance of payment flows. Balance of payment FDI flows do not corre- 320  Harry Grubert and John Mutti 
spond exactly with new subsidiary creation, nor are these flows wholly inde- 
pendent  of  PPE. BEA data do not  at present  allow  disaggregation of  new 
equity flows from parent to subsidiary into flows to new (greenfields) subsid- 
iary creation, to takeovers of previously noncontrolled but existing firms, and 
to expansion of existing controlled subsidiaries. This disaggregation would be 
desirable for a thorough testing of my interpretation. 
My major point here however is that the PPE and balance of payments mea- 
sures of FDI activity really  measure two quite different aspects of multina- 
tional firm activity. The contribution of Grubert and Mutti is to recognize that 
when one wishes to perform analysis of FDI to policy changes, one is dealing 
with  a phenomenon  (i.e., the behavior of  multinational firms) that is both 
subtle and complex and cannot be adequately captured with one quantitative 
measure. Which of the two existing data series is appropriate for the analysis 
depends entirely upon what one is trying to do-with  the caveat that neither 
of these series is likely to capture perfectly the exact behavior one wishes to 
know  about.  With  respect  to all econometric  analysis of  international eco- 
nomic transactions, of course, we live in a world of incomplete and imperfect 
information.  But in the subworld of FDI, the existing data series tend to be 
more imperfect and incomplete than most. 